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Abstract—In case of collaborative modeling, complex systems
are developed by different stakeholders, in offline submissions
or online sessions. To guarantee security, access control policies
need to be enforced during the collaboration.
As levels of required confidentiality and integrity may vary
across model parts, we have previously proposed fine-grained
rule-based access control, and shown how to consistently interpret
flexible access control policies.
Now we present an improvement on the previous results
allowing for incremental recomputation, which is vital for online
collaboration scenarios. Our approach is illustrated using a case
study of the MONDO EU project.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Model-based systems engineering has become an increas-
ingly popular approach [1] in critical cyber-physical systems
followed by many system integrators like airframers or car
manufacturers to simultaneously enhance quality and pro-
ductivity. An emerging industrial practice of such system
integrators is to outsource the development of various compo-
nents to subcontractors in an architecture-driven supply chain.
Distributed teams of different stakeholders (system integrators,
software engineers of component providers/suppliers, hard-
ware engineers, specialists, certification authorities, etc.) may
collaborate using models.
In an offline collaboration scenario, collaborators check out
an artifact from a version control system (VCS) and commit
local changes to the repository in an asynchronous long trans-
action. In online collaboration, engineers may simultaneously
edit a model in short synchronous transactions which are
immediately propagated to all other users (similarly to online
collaborative tools like Google Docs). Several collaborative
modeling frameworks exist [2], but security management is
unfortunately still in a preliminary phase.
In fact, collaborative scenarios introduce significant chal-
lenges for security management, both in terms of confiden-
tiality and integrity. For instance, the detailed internal design
This paper is partially supported by the MTA-BME Lendület 2015 Research
Group on Cyber-Physical Systems. The first author was supported by the János
Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
of a specific component needs to be revealed to certification
authorities to obtain certification credit but they need to
be hidden from competitors who might supply a different
component in the system. Furthermore, there may be critical
aspects of the system model that may only be modified by
domain experts having the appropriate qualifications.
Capturing security policies on the storage (file) level instead
of the model level results in inflexible fragmentation of models
in collaborative scenarios (although flexibility is key [3]);
this can be solved by fine-grained access control, where
each model element and its features can have its own set
of permissions. On the other hand, large industrial models
can have millions of model elements, thus explicitly assigning
permissions for each of them, as well as maintaining the
permissions after changes to the model, would be labor-
intensive and error-prone, and would make it difficult to
understand the system of privileges.
A rule-based approach for concisely defining fine-grained
model access control policies has been proposed in [4]. A
single rule may grant or deny nominal permissions for many
elements in a model. Due to this implicit nature, it is possible
that several rules would be in direct conflict with each other,
assigning contradictory permissions for some model element.
Indirect conflicts are also possible, if the fragment of the
model revealed to a user is not consistent with itself, or
with the write permissions. In [5], we resolve conflicts in a
deterministic and customizable way to present a consistent
and secure updateable view to each user.
The solution in [5] relies on an algorithm that can be
executed for a given state of the model to derive the effective
permissions from the nominal ones. However, this strategy
might not scale up to larger system models in case of online
collaboration, as the algorithm would have to re-process the
permissions of all model elements after each small editing
operation, leading to unacceptable response times.
B. Goals and Contributions
In this paper, we investigate a possible way to incremen-
talize the conflict resolution schema, so that small changes
within large models would incur a small maintenance com-
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Figure 1: Simplified Metamodel of Offshore Wind Turbines
putation only. Such an incremental resolution method would
(a) supercede the limited-scope proof-of-concept incremental
conflict resolver used in the online scenario experiments of [4],
(b) inherit the beneficial features (flexibility, consistency, de-
terminism) of the non-incremental resolver algorithm [5], and
(c) complement the incremental policy rule evaluation and en-
forcement techniques presented in [4] to guarantee acceptable
performance for online in addition to offline collaboration.
We achieve this goal by reformulating the original algorithm
of [5] as a recursive Datalog [6] query on the system model
(technically recursive VIATRA [7] graph patterns), for which
incremental evaluation algorithms are known. We point out
subtle difficulties with the evaluation of the resulting patterns,
and suggest solutions for dealing with them.
II. CASE STUDY
A. Modeling Language
Several concepts will be illustrated using a simplified ver-
sion of a modeling language for system integrators of offshore
wind turbine controllers, which is one of the case studies of the
MONDO EU FP7 project. The metamodel, defined in EMF [8]
and depicted by Fig. 1, describes how the system is modeled
as modules organized in a containment hierarchy of composite
modules. Composite modules may express protected IP and
they can ultimately contain control unit modules that are
responsible for a given type of physical device (such as pumps,
heaters or fans).
Example 1. A sample instance model containing a hierarchy
of 3 Composite modules and 4 Control units is shown in
Fig. 2 – boxes represent objects, entries within the box are
attribute values, and edges are containment references.
1) Access Restrictions: We assume that each control unit
type (Pump, etc. . . ) is associated with a specific person (re-
ferred to as specialist) who is responsible for maintaining the
model of control unit modules of that specific type. Each such
user is able to modify the control units that belong to them,
they cannot access to any control unit contained directly or
indirectly by composite module that express protected IP. For
instance, the user responsible for pump controllers (the Pump
Control Engineer) can modify the controller ctrl1 but cannot
see the object ctrl4 as it is contained c2 which describe that
its content is protected. Finally, there is a principal engineer
Figure 2: Sample Wind Turbine Instance Model
that oversees the entire module structure and has read and
write access to the entire model.
2) Online Usage Scenario: The system integrator company
is hosting the wind turbine control model on their collabo-
ration server, where it is stored, versioned, etc. A group of
users may participate in online collaboration, where they
are continuously connected to the central repository via an
appropriate client (e.g. web browser). Through their client,
each user sees a live view of those parts of the model that
they are allowed to access. The users can modify the model
through their client, which will directly forward the change to
the collaboration server. Then the server will decide whether
the change is permitted under write access restrictions. If
it is allowed, then the views of all connected users with
appropriate read permissions will be updated transparently
and immediately. However, changes introduced by a user may
influence the accessibility of model parts for other users.
Hence, the access control policy has to be reevaluated when
the model is changed.
Example 2. After the Principal Engineer changes the pro-
tectedIP attribute of the composite module c2 from true to
false, the Pump Control Engineer shall be able to access
the contained pump control module ctrl4.
III. SECURITY VOCABULARY
Here we briefly introduce a vocabulary for fine-grained
access control; a more detailed treatment can be found in our
previous work [4] and especially [5].
A. Model Facts as Assets
In order to provide fine-grained access control, models have
to be decomposed into smaller assets that can be separately
protected. For simplicity, we will consider models as a set of
elementary model facts. For example, EMF models (ignoring
the multi-resource case) consist of the following kinds of
model facts:
Object facts are pairs formed of a model element (EObject)
with its exact type (EClass), for each model element object;
e.g. obj(c1,Composite).
Attribute facts are triples formed of a source EObject, an
attribute name (EAttribute) and the attribute value, for each
(non-default) attribute value assignment; e.g. attr(ctrl3, cy-
cle,::low).
Reference facts are triples formed of a source EObject, a
reference type (EReference) and the referenced EObject, for
each containment link and cross-link between objects; e.g.
ref(c1,submodules,ctrl2).
Note that for multi-valued attributes and references, each of
the multiple entries at a source EObject will be represented
by a separate attribute or reference fact.
In the following, we will focus on object facts, but the same
formal framework applies to all assets.
B. Permissions
The above mentioned model facts are the assets that the
access control policy will protect against operations (typically
read and write) that can be performed by the user. The goal of
interpreting the security policy is to come up with an effective
permission function that assigns a permission level to each
combination of asset, user and operation.
The assigned permission level takes its value from a permis-
sion lattice characteristic to the operation. In the simplest case,
this is the two-valued lattice {deny < allow}; in general it is
possible to use a more refined lattice instead. In the rest of the
paper, we will restrict ourselves to the case where the lattice
is a total order, i.e. from any two levels, one is considered
strictly more restrictive than the other.
For instance, it was previously suggested [5] to use {deny <
obfuscate < allow} as read permission levels, to express the
case where an attribute of an otherwise visible object conveys
confidential information that shall not be revealed to the given
user, but the attribute can not be completely hidden (since it
is used as e.g. an identifier or visual label).
A sample refinement of the write permission levels could
be {deny < dangle < allow}, where cross-references with
write permission level dangle can not be normally modified
by the user, but they can be removed as the side effect of
deleting the target object of the reference (if that deletion is
permitted), even if the cross-link is not visible to the user.
Imagine a traceability link that points from a hidden part of
the model to a visible object; the difference between assigning
deny or dangle is that the target object can not be deleted by
the user in the former case, while its deletion would be allowed
(with an invisible side-effect of removing the traceability link)
in the latter case.
C. Consistency of Secure View
The view presented to a user consists of the set of assets
for which they have read permissions (modulo obfuscation,
see above). However, an arbitrary set of model facts does not
necessarily constitute a valid model; there may be internal
consistency constraints (also called referential integrity con-
straints) imposed on the facts by the modeling platform to
ensure the integrity of the model representation and the ability
to persist, read, and traverse models. A major goal stated in [4],
[5] requires that secure models must be synthesized as a set
of model facts compatible with all internal consistency rules.
Note that we distinguish these low-level internal consistency
rules from high-level, language-specific well-formedness con-
straints. Violating the latter kind does not prevent a model
Figure 3: Effective Perms. for Pump Control Engineer
from being processed and stored in the given modeling tech-
nology, as error markers can be placed on such violations.
Thus only internal consistency is essential for access control.
Internal consistency of the filtered view implies that the
effective permissions must satisfy a some constraints that
are expressed as a strong dependency relationship between
two values of the effective permission function: a dependant
and a dependee. According to the formalization in [5], this
relationship is a Galois connection. This means that if a lower
bound is known for the permission level of the dependant,
then a lower bound on the permission level of the dependee
is inferred; and conversely, an upper bound on the dependee
puts an upper bound on the dependant. For instance, (a) if an
asset is writable (write permission level allow), then it must
also be visible (at least on the read permission level allow);
(b) if an object is readable at least on the level obfuscate, then
its containing object (if any) must also be visible (at least on
the level obfuscate). All of these constraints have a converse,
e.g. if an object is not visible (read permission level is at most
deny), then any contained objects have their read permission
level at deny as well.
Apart from the strong dependencies discussed above, the
concept of weak consequences were also introduced in [5], to
express defaults rather than strict implications. For example,
all contained elements and attributes of a visible object should
also be made visible by default - unless there is another reason
to deny the read permission. Also, if the read permission for an
object is known to be at most obfuscate, its write permission
must be at most dangle as a strong consequence, but (weak
consequence) it should be deny by default, unless specifically
overridden.
Example 3. Fig. 3 depicts the effective permissions of the
running example for the Pump Control Engineer. As c2
expresses protected IP, read and write operations are denied
for the composite c2 and its contents, visualized by dashed
borders in case of objects and dashed edges in case of refer-
ences. On the other hand, the control module ctrl1 needs
to be modifiable, therefor also visible (strong dependency)
denoted by RW in a square. As ctrl1 needs to be visible,
its container c1 and also the root module root need to be
visible at least in an obfuscated way (strong dependency)
Listing 1 Queries for Access Control Rules
1 pattern pumpControlPattern(ctrl:Control)
2 { Control.type(ctrl,::Pump)}
3
4 pattern propectedIPPattern(c:Composite)
5 { Composite.protectedIP(c,true)}
denoted by O in squares. There are no explicit restrictions
related to the attributes of control module ctrl1, so they
inherit visibility from the object asset (weak consequence).
IV. PREVIOUS WORK
Using the vocabulary introduced in Sec. III, we now briefly
revisit the rule-based access control solution and the non-
incremental conflict resolver introduced by [5]. More detailed
descriptions with concrete examples can be found in the
referenced paper.
The design goals were to allow the policy engineer to
declaratively, concisely but also flexibly express permissions
for a large number of assets in the form of rules. This was
achieved by providing a (terminating, deterministic) algorithm
that interprets these rules and resolves conflicts among them
(also taking into account the defaults), yielding an effective
permission function that meets the intentions of the policy
engineer and satisfies the dependencies among assets.
A. Rule-based Access Control
In [4], we introduced a rule-based access control approach,
where the rules are defined by graph queries (model queries).
Such a query is essentially a formula that can be evaluated on
the model. When a query is evaluated, the results consist of
a set of pattern matches. Rules grant or deny read and write
permissions to the assets identified by the pattern matches of
a query. Of course, a rule may only affect a subset of users, so
a selection of users/groups is given as well. Finally, a priority
class π ∈ Π is given as well, according to which conflicts are
resolved: the higher priority rule overrides the lower priority
one according to the total order of Π. To unburden the author,
the order of rules in the policy may be taken as a default
assignment of priority classes.
To summarize, an access control rule in the policy consists
of a set of affected users/groups, a model query to identify
affected assets, a priority class π ∈ Π, an affected operation,
and an upper or lower bound on the permission level of that
operation.
We allow for compound rules as concise syntactic sugar,
where the policy engineer can specify more than one rule
(corresponding to the above structure) in one go. For instance,
it shall be possible to set both read and write permissions to
deny, or to set the upper and lower bound of a read permission
to obfuscate simultaneously.
The conflict resolution process of one user is independent
from any other users. Therefore in the following sections,
we consider permissions from the perspective of a single
user only, and omit the user identity from the subsequently
introduced structures.
Listing 2 Access Control Rules of the Example
1 policy Example deny RW by default {
2 rule accessModule allow W to PumpCtrlEng
3 { query: pumpControlPattern } priority 1
4
5 rule hideModule deny R to PumpCtrlEng
6 { query: propectedIPPattern } priority 2
7 }
Example 4. Lst. 1 specifies the graph queries for access con-
trol rules in VIATRA syntax. Pattern pumpControlPattern
selects all control module of type ::Pump while pat-
tern propectedIPPattern queries the composite modules
where the protectedIP is to true.
The policy described in Lst. 2 using the syntax introduced
in [5] refers these graph pattern to specify access control
rules. Rule accessModule allows the write operation of
modules identified by pattern pumpControlPattern and
rule hideModule denies the read operation of modules
selected by pattern propectedIPPattern. Priorities of the
rules are 1 and 2, respectively.
The policy specifies the global default that all the assets
are unreadable and unmodifiable. Rule accessModule as-
signs read permissions to objects ctr1 and ctrl2 which is
the result set of pattern pumpControlPattern) while rule
hideModule denies the read permission of c2 the result set
of pattern propectedIPPattern.
B. Judgments
During the process of conflict resolution, the algorithm
maintains a set of (typically conflicting) direct and indirect
consequences of the access control rules.
We define a permission set as a set of judgments, where each
judgment j is a tuple j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩, where a ∈ Assets is
an asset, o ∈ {R,W} is an operation (read or write) to be
performed on the asset, p ∈ Levelso is a permission level
associated with the operation, ψ ∈ Ψ = {>,<} indicates
whether the judgment puts that permission level as an upper
respectively lower bound for the final permission decision, and
π ∈ Π is a priority class.
A valid permission set is complete, i.e. for each asset and
operation, it must contain at least one upper bound and one
lower bound judgment, and by the ordering of permission
levels, the lowest (strictest) upper bound must not be higher
than the highest (strictest) lower bound.
The initial permission set is obtained from rules and de-
faults. For all assets and operations, default permissions are
included as a pair of judgments (one upper bound, one lower
bound, both with the same permission level), with a priority
class that is lower than the priority of any query-based rule;
this ensures completeness. For each match of the queries
of security rules that apply for the user, an upper or lower
bound judgment is added; the asset is given by the pattern
maftch, and the operation, priority class and permission level
are determined by the rule header.
The goal is to derive the resolved permission set, where the
highest (most permissive) lower bound is equal to the lowest
Table I: Initial Judgments of the example Rules
⟨obj(ctrl1,Control),W, allow,<, 1⟩
⟨obj(ctrl4,Control),W, allow,<, 1⟩
⟨obj(c2,Composite), R, deny,>, 2⟩
Table II: Global Defaults on Control Module ctrl1
⟨obj(ctrl1,Control), R, deny,<, 0⟩
⟨obj(ctrl1,Control), R, deny,>, 0⟩
⟨obj(ctrl1,Control),W, deny,<, 0⟩
⟨obj(ctrl1,Control),W, deny,>, 0⟩
upper bound for each asset and operation (thereby identifying
a single permission level as the effective permission), and
there are no conflicts (neither directly nor indirectly though
dependencies) between the judgments.
Example 5. The initial permission set obtained from
the evaluation of access control rules accessModule and
hideModule is collected in Table I. Global defaults deny all
access with 4 judgments per asset (both bounds (>,<) and
operations (R,W) set to deny), e.g. the default judgments of
the control module ctrl1 are listed in Table II.
C. Propagation of Consequences
In Sec. III-C we discussed how the requirement of internal
consistency introduces dependencies between the permission
levels of different assets and operations.
As a judgment may impose dependency constraints on other
assets or operations, its consequences can be propagated and
directly represented as additional judgments on foreign asset/-
operation pairs. Using the propagated consequence judgments,
all indirect conflicts can be transformed into local conflicts.
The latter means that the conflict is expressed as two directly
contradicting judgments for the same asset and operation,
as opposed to dependency-driven indirect conflicts between
judgments at different assets of operations. It was discussed
in [5] how consequence propagation makes focusing on local
conflicts sufficient.
For judgment j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩ of bound ψ ∈ Ψ =
{>,<}, with a dependency on asset and operation ⟨a′, o′⟩,
the propagated strong consequence judgment is denoted as
j⟨a′,o′⟩ := ⟨a′, o′, l, ψ, π⟩ where l is the bound associated with
p by the Galois connection described in Sec. III-C.
Extending the above notion, is also possible to propagate
weak consequences that encapsulate a default effect of a
given judgment, not a necessary condition. Unlike its strong
counterpart, a weak consequence does not inherit the priority
of the original judgment, but is assigned a lower priority
instead, and may be overridden by more dominant judgments
without conflicting with the original judgment. It can be for-
mally captured as j∗⟨a′,o′⟩ := ⟨a′, o′, l∗, ψ, π∗⟩. It was proposed
in [5] to assign a priority class to these weak consequences
that is lower than the priority of any user-specified rule, but
higher than the priority of global defaults that such a weak
consequence may override.
Example 6. The judgment ⟨obj(c2,Composite), R, deny,>, 2⟩
obtained from the rule hideModule needs to be propa-
gated to the contained objects of composite c2 as strong
dependency. Hence, new judgments appear with exactly
the same priority, operation, permission level and bound,
namely the judgments ⟨obj(ctrl3,Control), R, deny,>, 2⟩ and
⟨obj(ctrl4,Control), R, deny,>, 2⟩. However, the new judg-
ment ⟨obj(ctrl4,Control), R, deny,>, 2⟩ is in local conflict
with the judgment ⟨obj(ctrl4,Control), R, allow,<, 1⟩ obtained
from the rule accessModule (see Table I) as they refer to
the same asset and operation and contradict on the permission
bound (at least allow vs. at most deny).
D. Dominance and the Resolution Step
Take any two judgments that are in conflict. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that one must dominate the
other via its higher priority class (see [5] for the unimportant
nuance of conflicts within the same priority class). Due to the
consequence propagation introduced in Sec. IV-C, it is enough
to consider local conflicts, as any conflict will manifest itself
somewhere as a local conflict. Therefore we consider pairs of
judgments on the same asset and operation, where one is an
upper bound judgment, and the other is an incompatible lower
bound judgment with different priority.
A resolution step takes two judgments that are in a local
conflict, and modifies the dominated judgment to make it
compatible with the dominant judgment. For locally conflict-
ing judgments j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩ and j′ = ⟨a, o, p′, ψ′, π′⟩
with π > π′ the conflict resolution replaces j′ with j′′ =
⟨a, o, p, ψ′, π′⟩. Executing such a step transforms a permission
set to a different one.
Observations on the resolution step: (a) j′′ relaxes j′, i.e.
upper bounds are raised when replaced, while lower bounds
are lowered. (b) j′′ is guaranteed by the construction to be
non-conflicting with j. (c) The resolution step upholds the
completeness of the permission set.
Example 7. In Ex. 6 , a local conflict is introduced by
propagation of strong dependency. Due to domination, the
judgment ⟨obj(ctrl4,Control), R, deny,>, 2⟩ with higher pri-
ority relaxes the judgment ⟨obj(ctrl4,Control), R, allow,<, 1⟩
to ⟨obj(ctrl4,Control), R, deny,<, 1⟩.
E. Resolution Process
The non-incremental resolution process (see Alg. 1) pro-
posed in [5] iterates over judgments in the order of dominance
(i.e. highest priority first), to propagate their consequences
(also the weak consequences, unless contradicted by a pre-
viously processed judgment) and resolve any local conflicts
that are detected.
The analysis in [5] shows that this process always termi-
nates, yields a deterministic (confluent) result regardless of
the choice of unprocessed dominant judgment, and the result
is a complete and consistent effective permission set.
Algorithm 1 The resolution process of [5] in pseudocode
◃ The policy is assumed as an implicit global parameter
function GETEFFECTIVEPERMISSIONS(model, user)
permissionSet← getInitialPermissions(model, user)
processed← ∅
while permissionSet ̸⊆ processed do
j ← chooseDominant(permissionSet \ processed)
processed← processed ∪ {j} ◃ mark as effective
for all dependencies ⟨a′, o′⟩ of j do ◃ propagate
conseq ← {j⟨a′,o′⟩} ◃ strong consequence
if ̸ ∃ j′ ∈ processed conflicting j∗⟨a′,o′⟩ then
conseq ← conseq ∪ {j∗⟨a′,o′⟩} ◃ weak
end if
permissionSet← permissionSet ∪ conseq
end for
conflicts← localConflictsOf(j, permissionSet)
for all j′ ∈ conflicts do ◃ resolve locally
j′′ ← ResolutionStep(j, j′) ◃ j dominates
permissionSet← permissionSet ∪ {j′} \ {j′′}
end for
end while
return permissionSet
end function
Example 8. The output of the algorithm on the case study
is presented in Ex. 3 and visualized in Fig. 3.
V. DECLARATIVE REFORMULATION
A. Motivation
In Sec. IV, we presented the algorithm of [5] for obtaining
the effective permissions from the nominal permissions ex-
plicitly assigned by the access control rules of the policy. The
algorithm can be run on a state of the model to produce the
effective permissions of all model elements.
This is an adequate solution for the offline collaboration
scenario, which is characterized by infrequent commit actions
at the end of long transactions, which may change an arbitrar-
ily large part of the model. And even if the change themselves
turn out to be relatively small, the complexity of processing the
commit is at least proportional to the size of the model anyway,
unless a sophisticated fine-grained diff solution is applied.
On the other hand, online collaboration is characterized by
frequent and short transactions, each of which change only a
small part of the model. In case of larger models, response
times would suffer greatly if the entire model had to be
re-processed upon each small change. Therefore, we aim to
obtain the effective permission function by an incremental
computation.
The evaluation of access control queries and the actual en-
forcement of permissions is also performed incrementally [4].
It would seem natural to try to express the conflict resolution
and derivation of effective permissions as model queries, and
use the same technology [9], [7] that already provides the
incremental evaluation of access control queries.
In the following, we describe our efforts to reformulate
the algorithmic conflict resolution process into a declarative
computation. We use the formalism of recursive graph queries
(Datalog [6]), specifically the VIATRA syntax.
B. Naive Reformulation
For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion will
focus on object assets only. The conflict resolver takes the
following inputs (extensional relations in Datalog parlance):
• The explicit judgments that are immediately obtained by
evaluating the access control rules in the policy; as men-
tioned above, each match of the associated model query of
the rule will yield a judgment (in the initial permission set).
• Low-priority judgments corresponding to global defaults
(can be merged with the former).
• Relations describing the connections between assets, in
order to enable the propagation of consequent judgments.
For instance, in case of object facts, a binary relation
describing the containment hierarchy is necessary.
From these extensional relations, the following incremen-
tally maintained queries (intensional relations) are derived (see
also Lst. 3):
judgment matches all inferred judgments j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩,
computed as the union of explicit judgments, the strong
and weak consequent judgments, and the relaxed forms of
dominated judgments.
relaxedJudgment identifies judgments that are dominated
(see next query), and computes their relaxed form (inheriting
the bound of the dominant judgment).
domination identifies the judgments in local conflict (suf-
ficient as per Sec. IV-C) and the dominant one among
them; this query matches pairs of dominating and dominated
judgments in local conflict, respectively j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩
and j′ = ⟨a, o, p′, ψ′, π′⟩, that are defined on the same asset
and operation, with the dominating judgment having higher
priority (π > π′) and the dominated bound contradicting it
(p′ψp for ψ ∈ Ψ = {>,<}, as expressed by helper pattern
permissionOutOfBound). For efficiency, only effective
judgments (see next query) are considered for the role of
the dominating judgment.
effectiveJudgment matches any judgment that is not dom-
inated at all by any judgment, i.e. there is no corresponding
match of the domination query. Note that this is a negative
composition.
strongConsequence computes the propagated
consequences of effective judgments; it matches pairs
of judgments j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩ and j′ = ⟨a′, o′, p′, ψ′, π′⟩
where j is an effectiveJudgment and j′ = j⟨a′,o′⟩. For
strong consequences, π = π′ is also required. The results
are computed as a union of cases, two for each kinds
of dependency; one where a dominant lower bound on a
dependant propagates a lower bound consequent judgment
to the dependee asset, and one where a dominant upper
bound on a dependee propagates an upper bound consequent
judgment to the dependant asset. In case of object assets,
such dependencies are found between the read and write
operations of the same asset, and between contained and
container objects (see Sec. III-C).
weakConsequence is constructed similarly, except the con-
sequent has a constant, low priority.
Listing 3 Naive solution in VIATRA syntax (extracts)
1 pattern judgment(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio)
2 { find explicitJudgment(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio);
3 } or {
4 find relaxedJudgment(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio);
5 } or {
6 find strongConsequence(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio);
7 }
8 pattern relaxedJudgment(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio)
9 { find domination(user,asset,op,_,dir,prio,bound);
10 }
11 pattern effectiveJudgment(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio)
12 { find judgment(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio);
13 neg find domination(user,asset,op,bound,dir,prio,_);
14 }
15 pattern domination(user,asset,op,dBound,dDir,dPrio,eBound)
16 { find judgment(user,asset,op,dBound,dDir,dPrio);
17 find effectiveJudgment(user,asset,op,eBound,eDir,ePrio);
18 find permissionOutOfBound(eDir,eBound,dBound);
19 eDir!=dDir;
20 }
21 pattern strongConsequence(user,dAsset,dOp,dBound,dir,prio)
22 { // Case 1: read vs write, AT_LEAST
23 find effectiveJudgment(user,eAsset,eOp,eBound,dir,prio);
24 dAsset == eAsset; dir == BoundDirection::AT_LEAST;
25 eOp == SecurityOperation::WRITE;
26 eBound == WriteLevels::ALLOW_WRITE;
27 dOp == SecurityOperation::READ;
28 dBound == ReadLevels::ALLOW_READ;
29 } or {...} // Other cases
Note that for a given asset and operation, in addition to the
strictest effective upper or lower bound, there can additionally
occur less strict, superfluous judgments. It is possible to
eliminate them based on subsumption by stricter effective
judgments. If subsumed judgments are then eliminated from
the essential judgements, then their consequences won’t be
propagated, and some computational cost can be saved. The
simplest solution is probably to adjust domination so that it
does not check whether the bound direction of the dominated
judgment is opposite to the dominant one (i.e. remove the
last line of domination in Lst. 3), then in addition to actual
dominations, it will also match most such subsumed judgments
(except for the case where a judgment is subsumed by another
one in the same priority class).
The effective permission function is finally obtained as
the result set of the effectiveJudgment query, where the
strictest lower and upper bounds will coincide (see proof
in [5]). Let us now investigate the correctness of this solution.
Proposition: This group of queries yield the same effec-
tive permission set as Alg. 1.
Proof sketch: One has to consider the way of determining
the set of effective judgments, as the rest follows fairly
trivially. The original algorithm iteratively selected the highest-
priority yet-unprocessed judgment and designated it as an
effective judgment (by putting it into the processed set).
By contrast, here judgments are considered effective when
they are not dominated by any other judgment. It takes some
thinking to see that the two conditions yield the same results.
We use downwards induction by priority class; assume that
the two versions of the effective permission set are equivalent
above priority class π. When the original algorithm selects
a dominant judgment j of priority π as the new effective
judgment, the priority-based ordering ensures that there are
Figure 4: Dependency Graph of the Naive Queries
no unprocessed judgments in the permission set that could
dominate it, and of course already processed judgments are
not in conflict with j and thus do not dominate it (otherwise j
would have been relaxed and removed earlier when they were
processed); consequently, the effectiveJudgment query
would match j. Conversely, if the effectiveJudgment
query matches the judgment j of priority π, that means no
other higher-priority effective judgment dominates it, therefore
(by the induction hypothesis) the original algorithm never
eliminates it from the permission set, and it is eventually
selected as an effective judgment.
C. Non-Stratifiability
A significant flaw of the naive reformulation in Sec. V-B is
revealed when we consider how the results of these queries
are derived from each other.
Not counting extensional relations, the query judgment
derives from relaxedJudgment, strongConsequence and
weakConsequence as depicted in Fig. 4. The latter
two also derive their results from effectiveJudgment.
The relaxedJudgment references domination, while
domination uses judgment and effectiveJudgment. Fi-
nally, effectiveJudgment is computed from judgment,
permissionOutOfBound a negation of domination.
It is immediately obvious that this is a recursive query
structure, e.g. judgment refers indirectly to domination
which refers to judgment again. Fortunately, it is possible to
evaluate recursive queries (there are even multiple incremental
strategies [10]).
However, these strategies require a property of the
query structure called stratification [6], which the refor-
mulated conflict resolver does not exhibit. Informally, a
Datalog program is stratified if there are no negations
used in the cyclic references between predicates (i.e. re-
lations or patterns). In our case, a counterexample would
be effectiveJudgment negatively referring domination,
which in turn uses effectiveJudgment.
Typical query engines only handle stratified query struc-
tures, as non-stratified ones do not even have a single accepted
semantics [6], and 2-valued semantics are often not possible.
See for instance the famous example of a non-stratified Data-
log program “this sentence is a lie”.
Fortunately, there are a few relaxations of the criteria for
stratifiability. Recursions can still have definite (2-valued)
semantics (and evaluation algorithms) if they are locally [11],
modularly or at least weakly [12] stratifiable. Informally, these
relaxed notions of stratification investigate the dependencies
between individual tuples (so-called ground atoms) as opposed
to whole relations; it is sufficient if there is no negation in
circular references between tuples (in the ground Datalog
program). The subtle differences between local, modular and
weak stratification manifest themselves in the ways how
already known facts are used to cull unnecessary (e.g. unsat-
isfiable) references before cycles are evaluated to be negation-
free; the formal details are not explored here.
Although the query structure of Sec. V-B is neither strat-
ifiable nor locally stratifiable, it is weakly and even mod-
ularly stratifiable. The reason is that the only occurrence
of negation is between predicates effectiveJudgment and
domination; however, a judgment may only be dominated
by higher-priority judgments. After eliminating judgment pairs
from domination for which the priority comparison con-
straints fail (which is allowed in modular, but not in local
stratification), we are left with no tuple-level negative cycles.
Although modular stratifiability shows the existence of 2-
valued semantics, it is not necessarily compatible with all
evaluation strategies, especially incremental ones. Even if a
given strategy is guaranteed to yield correct results, concrete
tools such as VIATRA may pessimistically refuse to evaluate
a query structure that is not stratifiable (as detecting e.g. local
stratification may be undecidable [11]).
D. Performance Considerations
Beyond the question of stratification, the recursive query
structure also introduces performance challenges.
Imagine a single-root containment hierarchy consisting of n
objects altogether. Suppose we define k separate access control
rules in k different priority classes, each of which applies to the
root object, such that every other rule (those in even priority
classes) sets the read permission to allow, while the rest of the
rules set it to deny. In this case, query evaluation performance
depends greatly in the order of computations, even if the end
result is guaranteed to be the same.
If the query engine happens to propagate tuples in the
ascending order of the priorities of corresponding judgments,
then first all n objects are set to invisible by the lowest priority
rule, then the next rule is found to dominate the previous one
and all n objects are made visible again, etc., until finally the
effective permissions are obtained in O(n ∗ k) steps.
If, on the other hand, the query engine propagates tuples in
the order of descending priority, then the final read permissions
are set immediately in the highest priority class , and then the
rest of the rules are merely dominated, but never propagated.
This leads to O(n+ k) steps of computation.
Altogether, if the evaluation follows the original procedure
in Alg. 1 and processes high-priority rules first, then (strong)
consequences are never overruled, minimizing the amount of
work to be done. Unfortunately, declarative queries can be
executed with an arbitrary computation order chosen by the
query engine. Ordering by rule priority is a highly application-
specific optimization, and there is no standard way to make a
query engine such as VIATRA aware of it.
E. Improved Query Structure
The previous sections identified two significant issues with
the naive reformulation of the access control conflict resolution
problem, stratifiability and performance. Still, we do not
give up on using a general-purpose query tool to provide
incremental evaluation; instead, we propose a way to modify
the query structure such that it avoids both problems.
Fortunately, the solutions to both issues involve the same
weak ordering of tuples based on priority class. We therefore
propose to apply partial grounding, where given a policy
of k priority classes, we substitute all k values into each
priority variable of the query, blowing up each predicate into
k disjoint shard predicates (k2 in case of domination where
two judgments of different priority are involved). Priority
comparisons can be statically evaluated in this case.
There is one corner case where negative recursion still
persists, despite sharding the predicated according to priority:
the effectiveJudgment query for a given priority class
negatively calls the domination relation for the same priority
(of the dominated judgment), which is in turn derived from
dominated judgment matches of that priority, that on one
branch rely on strongConsequence matches, which call
effectiveJudgment, all of the same priority level. We
propose the following solution: we replace domination with
dominationBy that will no longer imply that a dominated
judgment exists; it merely asserts that an effective judgment
exists at a given priority, that would dominate any lower-
priority judgment at the given asset and the given permission
bound. This way the negative recursion is averted.
For priority class π, we define the following predicates (see
also Lst. 4):
judgmentπ matches all inferred judgments j = ⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩
of priority class π, computed as the union of explicit judg-
ments in class π, the strong and weak consequent judgments
in class π, and the relaxed forms of dominated judgments in
class π.
relaxedJudgmentπ identifies judgments of priority class π
that are dominated (see next query) by any priority π′ > π,
and computes their relaxed form (inheriting the bound of the
dominant judgment).
dominationByπ will match (independently of the existence
of any dominated judgments) all effective judgments j =
⟨a, o, p, ψ, π⟩ ∈ effectiveJudgmentπ of priority π and all
potential bounds p′ for the corresponding asset and operation
that would be dominated by it in local conflict (p′ψp for
ψ ∈ Ψ = {>,<}).
effectiveJudgmentπ filters judgmentπ to those judg-
ments that are not dominated, i.e. there is no corresponding
match of dominationByπ′ for any π′ > π.
strongConsequenceπ computes the propagated conse-
quences of effective judgments at class π.
weakConsequenceπ analogously.
In the above queries, the priority class comparisons “π′ >
π” are statically evaluated, and the generated disjunctions only
include the clauses where the result is true.
With this solution, the query structure is now stratifiable,
addressing the concerns of Sec. V-C. Also, a query engine
evaluating (or updating, in case of incrementality) it can
process individual predicates in their topological order, which
addresses the issue raised in Sec. V-D.
Once stratification is achieved, let us take a look at what
forms of (positive) recursion remain, keeping in mind that
these no longer pose an obstacle to incremental matching.
First, relaxedJudgmentπ contributes to judgmentπ and
vice versa. Note that there is no circularity on the tuple level,
as the original dominated judgments (as well as subsumed
ones) are always farther from the effective judgment than their
relaxed versions. Moreover, judgmentπ is partially expressed
from strongConsequenceπ , which finds consequences of
effectiveJudgmentπ that of course uses judgmentπ; in
this case it depends on our internal consistency constraints
whether consequences can cyclically justify each other (in the
simple cases described in this paper, they can’t). In application
scenarios where we know that there are no tuple-level cycles,
the fast default algorithm suffices to efficiently evaluate re-
cursive queries; for other cases, VIATRA provides the more
complex DRed algorithm [10] as well, guaranteeing correct
incremental maintenance for any stratified query structure.
Listing 4 Refined solution in VIATRA syntax (extracts)
1 pattern relaxedJudgement_at_0(user,asset,op,bound,dir){
2 find judgement_at_0(user,asset,op,dBound,dir);
3 find domination_by_1(user,asset,op,_dBound,bound);
4 } or {
5 find judgement_at_0(user,asset,op,dBound,dir);
6 find domination_by_2(user,asset,op,_dBound,bound);
7 } or {...}
8 pattern effectiveJudgement_at_0(user,asset,op,bound,dir){
9 find judgement_at_0(user,asset,op,bound,dir);
10 neg find domination_by_1(user,asset,op,bound,_);
11 neg find domination_by_2(user,asset,op,bound,_);
12 // ...
13 }
14 pattern domination_by_1(user,asset,op,dBound,dir){
15 find effectiveJudgment_at_1(user,asset,op,eBound,dir);
16 find permissionOutOfBound(dir,eBound,dBound);
17 } // ...
Finally, a note on space and time cost: a straightforward
upper bound on the size of the match sets can be obtained by
taking the Cartesian product of the domains of query variables.
In our example, there are 3 priority classes, 2 controlled
operations, 3 permissions levels (both for read and write),
etc.; in the end, for a fixed security policy, the upper bound
is proportional to both the model size (number of assets) and
the number of active (e.g. simultaneously connected) users. In
the non-recursive case, incrementally maintaining the result
of queries has time complexity proportional to the size of the
change (in the inputs, in the results, and also in any internal
cache structure), regardless of the size of the unchanged parts.
For recursive queries, such a straightforward linear relationship
can not always be established; performance analysis and
improvements (beyond the considerations of Sec. V-D) are
left as future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
File-based Access Control. Off-the-shelf file systems typ-
ically require resources (files and folders) to be explicitly la-
beled with permissions that take the form of an Access Control
List (ACL), or the simplified form user/group/others. An ACL
consists of entries (judgments) regarding which user/subject is
granted or denied permission for a given operation. Conflict
resolution is usually priority-based (first entry applies) within
the access control list, and restrictive among type II and type
III conflicts (e.g. contents of a hidden folder cannot be seen,
regardless of ACLs inside).
File-based solutions can be directly applied to MDE, but
cannot provide fine-grained access control, where different
parts of a model file have different permissions. Our policies
are fine-grained, use implicit rules (so that model elements
do not have to be explicitly annotated with judgments, which
is difficult to manually maintain as the model evolves), and
respect the modeling-specific challenges of consistency (such
as permission dependencies of cross-references); all the while
being more flexible in the conflict resolution method.
Access Control for XML Documents. A number of
standards such as XACML [13] (OASIS standard) provide
fine-grained access control for XML documents. These type
of documents are similar to models in a way, that they
consists of nodes with attributes that may contain other nodes.
XACML provides several combining algorithms to select from
contradicting policies. Similarly to our solution, it may use ex-
ternal and internal priorities together (ordered-(deny/permit)-
overrides) or only internal priorities (unordered-(deny/permit)-
overrides). In [14], fine-grained access control is formalized
using XPath for XML documents, which claims that the
visibility of a node depends on its ancestors, thus when a node
is granted access, then access is also granted to its descendants.
However, other dependencies are not discussed related to XML
Documents, while our approach [5] also considers e.g. cross-
references.
Context-aware Access Control RDF Stores. Models can
be persisted into triples to store them in triple or quad stores
(Neo4EMF[15], EMF Triple). Graph-based access control is
a popular strategy for many RDF stores (4store [16], Vir-
tuoso , IBM DB2) developed for storing large RDF data.
In case of RDF, fine-grained specification of access control
permissions are defined at triple level. In [17], a graph-based
policy specification language proposed over SPARQL [18],
but resolution of contradicting rules are not discussed. Amit
Jain et. al. [19] propose an access control model for RDF
and a two-level conflict resolution strategy that also takes
inconsistencies into account similar to our solution. But, it
uses only restrictive resolution without any configuration of
default values or priorities between rules.
Collaborative Modeling Environments. Currently, fine-
grained access control is not considered in the state of the
art tools of MDE such as MetaEdit+[20], VirtualEMF[21],
WebGME[22], EMFStore [23], GenMyModel [24], Obeo De-
signer Team [25], MDEForge [26] or the tools developed
according to [27]. See also the broader survey in [2].
The generic framework CDO [28] (used e.g. in [25]) pro-
vides both online collaboration and role-based access control
with type-specific (class, package and resource-level) permis-
sions, but no facility for instance level access control policy
specifications. However, there is a pluggable access control
mechanism that can specify access on the object level; it
should be possible to integrate fine-grained solutions such as
the currently proposed system.
The collaborative hardware design platform VehicleFORGE
stores their model in graph-based databases and has an access
control scheme TrustForge [29] that uses an implementation
of KeyNote [30] trust management system. This system is re-
sponsible for evaluating the request addressed to the database,
which can be configured in various ways. It supports unlimited
permission levels and it is also able to handle consistency
constraints by adding them as assertions. Conflict resolution
strategies are not discussed. AToMPM [31] provides fine-
grained role-based access control for online collaboration;
no offline scenario or query-based security is supported,
though. Access control is provided at elementary manipulation
level (RESTful services) in the online collaboration solution
of [32].
VII. SUMMARY
To support rule-based fine-grained access control under
internal consistency constraints, we have taken a significant
step towards efficient online collaboration by reformulating
the permission assignment problem into a special class of
Datalog programs that can be incrementally evaluated (taking
advantage of the priority hierarchy). We have also sketched a
proof of correctness for the reformulation. As a quick proof
of concept 1, we have implemented and evaluated queries
according to this scheme for an example policy.
In the future, we plan to (a) implement an automated
translation from an arbitrary policy to such a query structure,
(b) set up benchmarks to study (and, if necessary, improve)
the performance of the solution in practice, (c) investigate
incrementality with respect to policy changes.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Whittle, J. Hutchinson, and M. Rouncefield, “The state of practice in
model-driven engineering,” IEEE Software, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 79–85,
2014. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/MS.2013.65
[2] J. D. Rocco, D. D. Ruscio, L. Iovino, and A. Pierantonio, “Collaborative
repositories in model-driven engineering [software technology],” IEEE
Software, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 28–34, May 2015.
[3] D. D. Ruscio, M. Franzago, I. Malavolta, and H. Muccini, “Envisioning
the future of collaborative model-driven software engineering,” in ICSE-
C’17, May 2017, pp. 219–221.
[4] G. Bergmann, C. Debreceni, I. Ráth, and D. Varró, “Query-based
Access Control for Secure Collaborative Modeling using Bidirectional
Transformations,” in MoDELS’16, 2016, pp. 351–361.
1Available at https://github.com/bergmanngabor/
CommitMDE17reproduction
[5] C. Debreceni, G. Bergmann, I. Ráth, and D. Varró, “Deriving Effective
Permissions for Modeling Artifacts from Fine-grained Access Control
Rules,” in COMMitMDE@MoDELS’16, 2016, pp. 17–26.
[6] T. J. Green, S. S. Huang, B. T. Loo, and W. Zhou, “Datalog and recursive
query processing,” Found. Trends databases, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 105–195,
Nov. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1900000017
[7] G. Bergmann, I. Dávid, Á. Hegedüs, Á. Horváth, I. Ráth, Z. Ujhelyi,
and D. Varró, “Viatra 3: A reactive model transformation platform,”
in Theory and Practice of Model Transformations - ICMT 2015,
L’Aquila, Italy, July 20-21, 2015, pp. 101–110. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21155-8_8
[8] The Eclipse Project, “Eclipse Modeling Framework,” http://www.eclipse.
org/emf/.
[9] Z. Ujhelyi, G. Bergmann, Ábel Hegedüs, Ákos Horváth, B. Izsó,
I. Ráth, Z. Szatmári, and D. Varró, “EMF-IncQuery: An integrated
development environment for live model queries,” Science of
Computer Programming, no. 0, pp. –, 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167642314000082
[10] A. Gupta, I. S. Mumick, and V. S. Subrahmanian, “Maintaining views
incrementally (extended abstract),” in Proc. of the Int. Conf. on Man-
agement of Data, ACM, 1993, pp. 157–166.
[11] L. Palopoli, “Testing logic programs for local stratification,”
Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 103, no. 2, pp. 205 – 234,
1992. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/0304397592900136
[12] K. A. Ross, “Modular stratification and magic sets for datalog programs
with negation,” J. ACM, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1216–1266, Nov. 1994.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/195613.195646
[13] S. Godik and T. M. (eds), “eXtensible access control markup language
(XACML) version 1.0.” 02 2003.
[14] I. Fundulaki and M. Marx, “Specifying access control policies for XML
documents with XPath,” in 9th ACM Symposium on Access Control
Models and Technologies, 2004, pp. 61–69.
[15] A. Benelallam, A. Gómez, G. Sunyé, M. Tisi, and D. Launay,
“Neo4EMF, A scalable persistence layer for EMF models,” in Modelling
Foundations and Applications - 10th European Conf., ECMFA 2014,
2014, pp. 230–241.
[16] Garlik, “4store,” http://4store.org/trac/wiki/GraphAccessControl.
[17] F. Abel et al., “Enabling adanced and context-dependent access control
in RDF stores,” in The Semantic Web, 6th Int. Semantic Web Conf., 2nd
Asian Semantic Web Conf., 2007, pp. 1–14.
[18] E. Prud’hommeaux and A. Seaborne, “SPARQL query language for
RDF,” 07 2016.
[19] A. Jain and C. Farkas, “Secure resource description framework: an
access control model,” in 11th ACM Symposium on Access Control
Models and Technologies, 2006, pp. 121–129.
[20] J. Tolvanen, “MetaEdit+: Domain-specific modeling and product gen-
eration environment,” in Software Product Lines, 11th Int. Conf. SPLC
2007, Kyoto, Japan, 2007, pp. 145–146.
[21] C. Clasen, F. Jouault, and J. Cabot, “VirtualEMF: A model virtualization
tool,” in Advances in Conceptual Modeling. Recent Developments and
New Directions, 2011, pp. 332–335.
[22] M. Maroti et al., “Next Generation (Meta)Modeling: Web- and Cloud-
based Collaborative Tool Infrastructure,” in 8th Multi-Paradigm Model-
ing Workshop, Valencia, Spain, 09/2014 2014.
[23] The Eclipse Foundation, “EMFStore,” http://www.eclipse.org/emfstore.
[24] Axellience, “GenMyModel,” http://www.genmymodel.com.
[25] Obeo, “Obeo designer team,” https://www.obeodesigner.com/en/
collaborative-features.
[26] F. Basciani, J. D. Rocco, D. D. Ruscio, A. D. Salle, L. Iovino,
and A. Pierantonio, “MDEForge: an extensible web-based modeling
platform,” in CloudMDE@MoDELS, 2014.
[27] J. Gallardo, C. Bravo, and M. A. Redondo, “A model-driven de-
velopment method for collaborative modeling tools,” J. Network and
Computer Applications, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 1086–1105, 2012.
[28] The Eclipse Foundation, “CDO,” http://www.eclipse.org/cdo.
[29] P. U. DARPA VehicleFORGE, TrustForge: Flexible Access Control for
VehicleForge.mil Collaborative Environment, 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://cps-vo.org/node/6851
[30] M. Blaze and A. D. Keromytis, “The keynote trust-management system
version 2,” 1999.
[31] E. Syriani, H. Vangheluwe, R. Mannadiar, C. Hansen, V. Mierlo, and
H. Ergin, “AToMPM: A Web-based Modeling Environment,” MODELS
2013 Demonstrations Track, 2013.
[32] M. Farwick, B. Agreiter, J. White, S. Forster, N. Lanzanasto, and
R. Breu, “A web-based collaborative metamodeling environment with
secure remote model access,” in Web Engineering, ICWE 2010, Vienna,
Austria, July 5-9, ser. LNCS, vol. 6189. Springer, 2010, pp. 278–291.
